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Abstract. – A public-key cryptosystem, digital signature and authentication procedures based
on a Gallager-type parity-check error-correcting code are presented. The complexity of the
encryption and the decryption processes scale linearly with the size of the plaintext Alice sends
to Bob. The public-key is pre-corrupted by Bob, whereas a private-noise added by Alice to a
given fraction of the ciphertext of each encrypted plaintext serves to increase the secure channel
and is the cornerstone for digital signatures and authentication. Various scenarios are discussed
including the possible actions of the opponent Oscar as an eavesdropper or as a disruptor.
The goal of cryptography is to enable two people, usually referred to as Alice and Bob,
to communicate over an insecure channel in such a way that the opponent Oscar cannot
understand and decrypt the transmitted message.[1] A block message is called a plaintext, and
a long message is a sequence of plaintexts. In a general scenario, the plaintext is encrypted
by Alice through the key Ek and the result, ciphertext, is sent over the channel. A third
party, eavesdropping on the channel, cannot determine what the plaintext was. However,
Bob, who knows the encryption key, can decrypt the ciphertext using the key Dk and recover
the plaintext.
In a private-key system, the keys Ek and Dk are known only to Alice and Bob, and
it obviously increases the security of the channel. However, a private-key system requires
communication between Alice and Bob prior to the transmission of any plaintext. This
prerequisite makes the private-key communication impractical in modern communication,
especially in such areas as electronic commerce and Internet-based communication. The goal
of public-key systems is to devise a cryptosystem where it is computationally infeasible to
determine Dk given Ek, and hence the encryption rule Ek can be made public.
The secure channel and the efficiency of a public-key cryptosystem depends on many
parameters, among them: (a) the complexity to determine Dk given Ek; (b) the complexity
of the encryption/decryption processes; (c) the length of the ciphertext and the public-key in
comparison to the length of the plaintext.
The commonly used RSA cryptosystem[2] is based on the difficulty of factorizing large
integers. Its main drawback is that the complexity of the encryption/decryption processes is
of O(N2)/O(N3), where N is the length of the plaintext (see figure 1). For small N these
complexities are also small, but then the complexity to determine Dk given Ek may also be
accessible to Oscar. It was recently found that even N = 512 may be too small to ensure a
secure channel. Hence the complexity of the encryption/decryption becomes the bottleneck
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of public-key cryptosystems as well as for other tasks of the secure channel (digital signature,
authentication, etc.) based on such methods.
From the known cryptosystems it appears that there is a trade off between the secure channel
and the complexity of the encryption/decryption processes. In this work, we propose a new
secure cryptosystem, based on the preliminary bridge built between error-correcting codes and
cryptosystems by McEliece[3] with the following features and ingredients: (a) The complexity
of the encryption/decryption processes scale linearly with the size of the plaintext N . These
complexities can be easily reduced even further under parallel dynamics. (b) The method
is based on boolean operations between two sparse matrices, in contrast of factorizing large
integers in cryptosystems based on number theory. (c) Our method consists of many stochastic
ingredients; Bob adds noise to the public-key whereas Alice adds noise to the ciphertext. (d)
The method is applicable as a public-key cryptosystem, as well as for digital signatures and
authentication. A digital signature is used to specify the person responsible for the message,
and an authentication ensures the integrity of the plaintexts constructing the message.[1] It
is a challenge to have a secure public-key cryptosystem operating with low complexity which
can serve also for all the different tasks of the secure channel.
Before describing the details of our method, let us first categorize the possible capabilities
of Oscar: (a) An eavesdropper: Oscar may try to reveal the plaintext Alice is sending to Bob
from the transmitted ciphertext and/or the digital signature. (b) A distruptor: The message
Alice is sending to Bob can be repeated, replaced or corrupted during transmission by Oscar.
We may distinguish between a forged meaningful/meaningless signed plaintext. Note that the
ability to forge many meaningless but legally signed messages could cause a disastrous effect in
the event of real-time procedures. It may take some critical time for Bob to realize that legally
signed messages are forged messages rather than noisy ones. Note that in cryptosystems such
as RSA,[2] it is easy to forge a meaningless signed message or to repeat the transmission of
the same message or previously legally signed messages to Bob.
Our cryptosystem is based on an error correcting method known as the Gallager method[4]
or its MN version.[5, 6, 7] It comprises two sparse boolean matrices, A and B, of dimension-
alities M×N and M×M respectively, and the rate R ≡ N/M ≤ 1. Note that all operations
are in (mod 2). The encryption public-key is an M ×N matrix
Ek = B
−1A (mod 2) (1)
and the encrypted ciphertext is
C = Ek s (mod 2) (2)
Before the transmission, Alice adds noise (bits flipped with probability f) to C, such that the
received ciphertext is
r = C + n (mod 2) (3)
where n represents the noise. The decryption key
Dk = [A,B] (4)
is known only to Bob, who can find s by multiplying r with the matrix B to obtain z =
B (Eks+ n) = As+Bn . It requires solving the equation
[A,B]
[
s′
n′
]
= z , (5)
where s′ and n′ are the unknowns, but their statistics (for instance, unbiased message for s′,
and flip rate f for n′) are known. This may be carried out using standard methods such as that
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of belief network decoding.[5] In this method, representing a special case of parity-check codes,
each bit of the ciphertext C is derived from the parity of a sum of certain plaintext’s bits. It
has recently been shown, based on insight gained from the study of diluted spin systems[8] that
specific choices of cascading sub-matrices A and B can nearly saturate Shannon’s bound.[6, 7]
With the lack of noise and invertible Ek (otherwise decryption cannot be terminated
successfully with probability one), Oscar is able to easily recover s = E−1k r. In order to
make Oscar’s task more difficult, we follow the line of McEliese where noise is added to C,
namely, bits are flipped (0 → 1 or 1 → 0) with probability f .[1] In this event E−1k r results
in an approximated plaintext, sapp, where a fraction of the bits are wrong. For a given rate
R and large N , the maximal noise f (for which the decryption could terminate successfully
without error bits in the decrypted plaintext) is given by the maximal channel capacity[9]
Rc = 1 −H2(f) where H2(f) = −f log2(f)− (1 − f) log2(1 − f). Oscar’s task to recover s is
difficult, since he has to decompose Ek into the matrices B
−1 and A, which is known to be an
NP-complete problem.[10]
The main drawbacks of this cryptosystem are: (a) Strong finite size effects which are visible
even for large N = O(104). The decryption typically terminates with some percentages of
error bits, which is catastrophic from a practical point of view. (b) For large N , the encryption
evolves a product of a matrix (M ×N) Ek by the plaintext s, hence its complexity is O(N
2).
Similarly, the complexity of each step of the decryption is O(N2), eq. (5). Clearly it is less
than the cubic complexity of the decryption in RSA. However, if in practice one has to work
with N = 104, the reduction in the complexity becomes a drawback.[11] Furthermore, the size
of the public-key which has to be downloaded by Alice diverges as O(N2).
To overcome these drawbacks, which prevent the usefulness of error-correcting codes as a
cryptosystem, we used the following three observations. In error-correcting codes, the nature
of the channel typically has a statistical nature; a probability for a bit to flip or a width
of the Gaussian noise. Each transmitted bit has the same probability to flip from a given
distribution.[9] The first observation is that in a case where an error-correcting method serves
as a cryptosystem, Bob can pre-corrupt the public-key Ek = B
−1A in the following sense. In a
fraction pq of rows, part (all) of the elements are flipped at random. The location of these pqM
rows is known only to Bob. Hence, a fraction pq of the ciphertext is corrupted with an average
probability 1/2. Since this pre-corruption of Ek is common to all ciphertexts, we denote it
as a quenched noise, nq. The main purpose of the quenched noise is to make Oscar’s task of
decomposing Ek to B
−1 and A more difficult. Note that our cryptosystem works properly for
some sub-classes of matrices A and B, but for a random choice our cryptosystem fails with
probability one. Hence the task of Oscar is to find a decomposition which works properly
as a cryptosystem. The second observation: in addition to the pre-corruption process, Bob
publicizes a given fraction, p, of the ciphertext where Alice’s private-noise, na, can be added.
This localized private-noise consists of a flip rate f of given pM bits of the ciphertext. The
resulting ciphertext then comprises of frozen (non-flipped) bits, randomly flipped bits and
flipped bits with probability f . The presence of frozen/flipped bits in the plaintext serves to
increase the secure channel and to suppress finite size effects. Similar to Shannon’s bound,[9]
one can show that for a given rate R the maximal fraction of flipped bits with probability f is
pc =
1− pq −R
H2(f)
(6)
We assume that a fraction pq of the bits are flipped with probability 1/2, however, pc might even
be further improved for the following reason. In an error-correction scenario only statistical
properties of the plaintext and the flip rate are known, hence any decoded state obeying these
statistical features is valid. In contrast, Bob knows the manner in which Ek was corrupted and
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hence the error in the pqM corrupted bits should be consistent with the decrypted plaintext.
The most striking observation comes from various simulations on different random con-
structions of the matrix B, indicating the following rule. As long as the average connectivity,
number of non-zero elements per column, of B is smaller than 2, B−1 is sparse. A random
construction means that the elements of each row are chosen at a random position, with no
spatial structure. Since A is a sparse matrix with random positions of the non-zero elements, it
is clear that Ek is also sparse. Hence, for such matrices B, the size of the public-key Ek scales
linearly with the size of the plaintext. Furthermore, the complexity of the decryption process
also scales linearly with the size of the plaintext, as the number of iterations is of O(1) (see
details below). A comparison with encryption/decryption complexities of the RSA system[2] is
presented in figure 1 for various sizes of plaintexts. A sparse public-key is a necessary requisite
for an efficient encryption process of large plaintexts, which are of great practical importance.
For an average connectivity greater than 2, B−1 is heavily dense, and the number of non-zero
elements in Ek is around MN/2.
The sparseness of B for a connectivity less than 2 can be supported by the following
theoretical argument. Assume that the matrix B is constructed such that Bij = δi,j + δi+c,j
for i ≤ ρM and Bij = δi,j for i > ρM , where ρ < 1 and the average connectivity is 1 + ρ < 2.
This matrix can easily be inverted and one can show that for c = O(1) B−1 is dense (with
a small prefactor), but for c = O(N), B−1 is sparse. In a random construction the typical
distance between two non-zero elements belonging to the same row is of O(N). With respect
to this property it is similar to c = O(N). Furthermore, for connectivity below 2 the generic
graph represented by B is below the percolation threshold.
We perform simulations on R = 1/2 and 256 ≤ N ≤ 2048 with a few different classes
of matrices A and B and here we report only limited results. Each parameterization of
the matrices A and B was averaged over at least 105 plaintexts and 50 realizations. The
construction follows the spirit of the constructions for error-correcting codes of the Gaussian
channel and R = 1/2.[7] The structure of the matrix B is such that for i ≤ ρM there are two
non-zero elements at random positions where for i > ρM there is only one non-zero element.
The matrix A is constructed such that in the first ρ′M rows there are two non-zero elements
and in the remaining rows there are six non-zero elements chosen at random positions. In order
to break the inversion symmetry, where each row of A consists of an even number of non-zero
elements, a small number of rows were changed from 2 → 1 and 7 → 6 non-zero elements.
Note that the spatial separation between different rows of the matrices was done only for
demonstration, and to increase the security of the channel one can mix their locations. The
performance depends on the success rate of the decryption as a function of (N, p, pq, f), where
the private-noise was added to the first pM bits of the ciphertext. Let us present a few examples
among many where the decryption terminates successfully over at least 105 plaintexts in a finite
fraction of the realizations: (a) ρ = 1/2, ρ′ = 7/8 and (512, 0.53, 0−0.04, 0.04), (b) ρ = ρ′ = 3/4
and (1024, 0.53, 0−0.04, 0.075) and (c) ρ = 3/4, ρ′ = 7/8 and (768, 0.53, 0−0.04, 0.088). These
results indicate that the probability for a wrongly decrypted block (plaintext) is PB < 10
5. In
all the above-mentioned classes, the number of iterations of the belief algorithm is typically
∼ 10 steps, where the complexity of each step of the algorithm is of the order of the number
of non-zero elements in matrices A and B, O(N). No long tail in the distribution of the
convergence time was observed. Note that each belief iteration can be implemented in parallel
such that the time complexity can be reduced by O(1/N). Results indicate that finite size
effects are dramatically suppressed by the frozen bits (in contrast to homogeneous noise), and
can be improved even further by increasing N .
The location of frozen (non-flipped) bits of the ciphertext (1− p)M is known also to Oscar.
Hence, the secure channel forces the number of frozen bits (1 − p)M < N . Otherwise Oscar
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may try to solve E1−pk s1−p = C1−p, where 1−p indicates the relevant part of the matrix/vector
corresponding to the frozen bits. In such a case where E1−pk (of dimentionalities (1−p)M×N)
is invertible, Oscar can easily find the plaintext s.
Let us now discuss a possible attack on our cryptosystem. Oscar’s goal is to find a partial
public-key, Epartk , obeying the following constraints: (a) The dimentionalies of E
part
k isM
′×N
where N ≤ M ′ ≤ M . (b) The corresponding M ′ bits of the ciphertext are the correct ones.
(c) Epartk is invertible. In such an event Oscar can easily find the plaintext s, and the question
is, what is the probability of such an event? The number of frozen bits of the ciphertext is
(1 − p)M which was chosen to be less than N . Assuming these (1 − p)M rows are linearly
independent, Oscar has to guess additionalN−(1−p)M = N(R+p−1)/R correct rows in order
to construct a plausible invertible Epartk . The probability of such an event is (1− f)
N−M(1−p)
and it becomes negligible as we increase the size of our plaintext. Furthermore, in simulations
we realized that the rank of the (1−p)M correct rows is is ∼ 0.9(1−p)M . Hence Oscar has to
guess additional correct rows and the probability of such an event decreases even further. Last
but not least, how does Oscar know that he chose the correct rows? A plausible answer to
this question is that any set of additional correct rows results in the same plaintext s. Hence,
Oscar may repeat the above attack many times and deduce that the most probable outcome is
the desired plaintext. The first difficulty with this scenario is that s has to appear many times
as an outcome, since we would like to distinguish between the signal, s, and the noise of other
possible outcomes. Secondly, the most probable (exponentially dominated) Epartk consists of
(N −M(1 − p))f > 0 wrong rows. It is true that all these Epartk do not necessarily result in
the same plaintext, but their distribution is still in question.
The secret information of Bob is the decomposition of the public-key Ek into B
−1 and A
and the quenched noise ,nq, used to corrupt the public-key. The secret information of Alice
is the plaintext s and the private noise, na. The key point of our signature scheme is that
after the decryption process terminates successfully Bob recovers not only the plaintext s but
also the private noise, na, added to the ciphertext. More precisely, on one hand side, from
the decryption of the plaintext s Bob knows the corrupted ciphertext by using the corrupted
public-key, Eks. On the other hand, Bob has in his hand the received ciphertext, Eks + na.
From the difference between these two pieces of information Bob can easily find na. The ability
of Bob to reveal na besides the plaintext is at the center of the discussion below. It shows how
Alice can use the additional information to sign and to keep the integrity of the message.
A simple signature is based on the following two ingredients: (a) Alice constructs an
additional plaintext comprising of a linear combination of s and na, X(s, na). The new
plaintext X is encrypted by Alice to a new ciphertext, t1, using Ek and a new private
noise na1. Alice transmits to Bob both ciphertexts, t and t1. (b) For verification, Alice
constructs by a known procedure a verifiable vector, V = V (s, na, na1). After the decryption
of both ciphertexts Bob knows all the ingredients of V and the verification can be carried
out. Note that for a one-time signature scheme where Oscar is functioning as an eavesdropper
only, our channel is secure. The usefulness of these signature schemes is twofold: (a) The
signature/verification procedure is very easy for Alice/Bob to implement with complexities of
O(N). (b) A plaintext repeated twice has in each transmission a different signature due to the
different private-noise. The main drawback of the above signature scheme is that Oscar can
easily forge a legal plaintext. There are exponentially many plaintexts s and private-noise na
and na1 which give the same verifiable vector V
It appears that in order to have a secret personal signature Alice has (a) to send additional
information besides the plaintext; and (b) to use her own known signature scheme based on
her cryptosystem, similar to using RSA for both the encryption and signature.[1] Surprisingly,
we demonstrate below that Alice can construct a secure signature without the transmission of
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any additional information besides the encrypted plaintext.
A simple scenario for an advanced secure signature is one in which Alice first generates a
vector V of rank N ′ < N using s and na following her public protocol. Next, the number of
1’s in V is truncated to a fixed number K (or ≤ K) following Alice’s public prescription. (For
rare events where there are no 1’s in V , Alice provides a special procedure). The signature,
Epartk V is left publicized by Alice, where E
part
k stands for the relevant rows corresponding
to the rank N ′. Determining V from the knowledge of Ek and the signature is known to
be a NP-complete problem (pg. 280 in ref. (14)). Bob, who knows s and na, can easily
verify the signature. One can easily make the situation more complex when Alice creates
a new cryptosystem in an on-line manner. For instance, based on the public-key, Ek, Alice
implements some permutations among the rows as a function of the detailed structure of s
(and/or na). The permutation scheme is publicized by Alice, which may be fixed for all
plaintexts/users or can be chosen time dependently. Let us denote the permute public-key
by EPk , hence the signature of s is t1 = E
P
k V , publicized by Alice but does not have to be
transmitted over the channel. Bob first decrypts t and obtains s and na. Next, Bob finds his
permuted public-key, EPk , using the public permutation prescription chosen by Alice, and then
easily verifies t1 from E
P
k V . Since the signature depends on s and na as well as on Ek, the same
plaintext transmitted to different addresses or at different times (different na) is characterized
by different signatures. As an eavesdropping, Oscar does not know s, na and also E
P
k . As a
disruptor, Oscar may try to replace the ciphertext t by t′ consisting of s′ and n′a such that
the signature of V = V (n′a) using the permuted public-key E
P
k (s
′) has the same signature as
that publicized by Alice. The lack of an independent permuted public-key as a function of the
plaintext seems to make the work of a disruptor even harder. In principle Alice can corrupt
her signature EPk V either by flipping some bits among a small fraction of the ciphertext or by
adding a noise consisting of na and s. In such a scenario Bob has first to decrypt s and na
and then to verify the decrypted signature with the public protocol of Alice. For a permuted
public key the decryption follows the permuted matrices Aper = A, and Bper is nothing more
than the same permutation as made for the rows of Ek, but now for the columns of B.
The aim of the authentication procedure is to keep the integrity of the message constructed
from a sequence of plaintexts, such that Oscar cannot forge (add/delete) ciphertexts. Using
error correcting codes as a cryptosystem this goal can be achieved by using correlated noise for
successive ciphertexts. Let us describe some possible scenarios. The private-noise for the first
ciphertext is chosen as explained above, where the noise for the next ciphertext is related to the
previous one by some permutations. The permutations may depend on (a) the private-noise of
the previous ciphertext; (b) the previous plaintext; (c) both the previous ciphertext, and the
private-noise. One may think that the permuted noise has to be bounded to the allowed regime
by Bob in order to ensure a successful decryption (which can be easily achieved). However,
there is no necessity for such a restriction, since after the decryption of the first plaintext, the
private-noise of the next ciphertext is uniquely determined and hence also the plaintext.
The advantage of such an authentication scheme is that Bob has only to decrypt the first
plaintext, whereas the rest of the message is uniquely defined, since the noise is known. On
the other hand, Oscar knows the authentication scheme and may concentrate only on the
decryption of the first ciphertext, or alternatively on an intermediate ciphertext (the easy one)
which reveals all successive plaintexts. In order to ensure the same security of (almost) all
plaintexts, one can use accumulated permutations. The private-noise for the current ciphertext
depends on all previous plaintexts/private-noise by a publicized procedure.
The tasks of our cryptosystem can be extended to other functions of the secure channel,
such as an undeniable signature. The private-noise is added out of the allowed range such that
the decryption cannot terminate successfully without Alice partially revealing her noise.
Alice has to keep as public information all previous signatures. The list of the signatures may
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Fig. 1. – Requested number of operations to encrypt/decrypt a ciphertext vs. the length of
the plaintext in bits. The encryption/decryption complexity for the RSA cryptosystem is
O(N2)/O(N3) (solid/dashed lines) and the prefactor is normalized to unity. The averaged
number of operations obtained in simulations for R = 1/2, ρ = 1/2, ρ′ = 3/4 and (N, p =
0.53, pq = 0−0.04, f = 0.045) are presented for the encryption/decryption (triangle/diamond)
processes, where error bars are less than the size of the symbols. As a guideline, a linear curve
with a prefactor equals to 30 is presented (long-dashed line). Note that in the encryption, the
complexity consists of boolean operations (eqs 1-3), where the complexity of the decryption
measures multiplications of real numbers, (eq. 5).
load Alice’s resources, and furthermore it may take a long time for Bob to find the appropriate
signature among many. This drawback can be alleviated by removing the signature into an
archive after verification by Bob.
In conclusion, let us briefly discuss a few of the advantages of our cryptosystem over methods
based on numbers theory, such as an RSA cryptosystem. First, the matrix operations/belief
network decoding in the decryption/encryption process can be carried out and implemented
in parallel. Secondly, a one-time success by Oscar to reveal a plaintext does not automatically
help or ensure the recovery of other plaintexts that Alice sent to the same Bob. Finally, in the
RSA method, for instance, Oscar’s task requires a check of many possible trails, where each
trail can be examined by the same algorithm. Hence, the task of Oscar can be easily split
among many resources. In contrast, our cryptosystem is based on many stochastic ingredients
with time dependent features of Alice and Bob. Hence the strategy of Oscar may need to vary
between different messages and users of the channel. Even for a given channel, the challenge
for future research is to find how to parallelize and to simplify the task of Oscar.
I. K. acknowledges fruitful discussions and comments by W. Kinzel. The content of this
work is patent pending.
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